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Abstract 
This paper examines trends in public support for government funding of univer-
sities over the past decade, identifies significant social factors related to atti-
tudes on university funding during this period, and briefly discusses possible 
future tendencies in public support for university funding. Growing public sup-
port for increased university funding in Ontario is documented. A variety of 
types of potential influences is assessed, including societal context, socio-eco-
nomic status, demographic and political orientation factors. Age, educational 
attainment, and community size, as well as support for general government 
spending, are found to have significant individual-level effects on support for 
university funding. Multi-variate analyses suggest a growing isolation of older, 
less formally educated and rural people as opponents of increased university 
funding. The implications of these patterns in the context of an aging but 
increasingly educated population are then considered. 
Résumé 
Cet article examine les tendances du soutien public à l'égard des subventions 
gouvernementales accordées aux universités au cours des dix dernières années, 
identifie d'importants facteurs sociaux qui sont liés aux attitudes vis-à-vis 
l'attribution des fonds aux universités durant cette période, et discute brièvement 
des t endances éventue l les d 'évolut ion du soutien public à l ' éga rd des 
subventions accordées aux universités. On montre qu'il existe un soutien 
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populaire croissant en faveur de l'augmentation des subventions accordées aux 
universités en Ontario. On évalue divers types d'influences possibles, y compris 
le contexte sociétal, le situation socio-économique, et les facteurs associés à 
l'orientation démographique et politique. L'âge, la scolarisation, la taille de la 
communauté dans laquelle on vit. ainsi que l 'appui accordé aux dépenses 
publiques de façon générale semblent avoir des effets significatifs sur le niveau 
de soutien accordé au financement universitaire. Des analyses multi-variées 
suggèrent que les personnes plus âgés, moins scolarisées et vivant en milieux 
ruraux s 'opposent davantage à l 'augmentat ion des fonds accordés aux 
universités. On conclut en examinant les implications de ces constats dans le 
contexte d'une population vieillissante et de plus en plus scolarisée. 
There appears to have been a substantial increase in the Canadian public's senti-
ments toward financial support of universities during the past decade. The limit-
ed national survey data suggest that support for increased government funding 
has at least doubled, from one-quarter to over a half, since the 1970s (e.g., 
Auld, 1979; Johnson, 1985; Poitras, 1990: Dyer, 1990; Gallup Canada, 1991). 
This trend is documented most extensively for Ontario by the findings of the 
biennial OISE Survey of Educational Issues (Livingstone, Hart, & Davie, 
1991).1 As Table 1 indicates, while less than one-third of the Ontario public 
supported increased university funding in 1980, a definite majority did so by the 
late 1980s. This pattern is part of a broad trend in funding preferences for all 
levels of formal education, including elementary and high schools as well as 
community colleges.2 Comparable if less pronounced trends have been found in 
extensive U.S. surveys of public attitudes toward education spending over the 
same period (Smith, 1989). 
These findings of increased support for education funding are probably 
quite robust. Critics of social policy polling often assert that mass publics 
always want more services for less taxes.3 In particular, spending preference 
questions have been regarded skeptically for not including realistic constraints, 
such as forced trade-offs among government services or revenue generating 
options to support higher expenditures. Admittedly, such poll questions are not 
equivalent to referenda on government spending, and introduction of other con-
textuating factors may well alter absolute levels of support. However, the criti-
cism has limited relevance to the attribution of aggregate trends and social 
group differences on the same "unconstrained" survey question over time. More 
to the point, there is now considerable evidence that people do tend to make 
t r ade -o f f s on policy spending issues (see Welch, 1985; Johnson, 1986; 
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Table 1 
"What woul vou like to see happen to government spending for the following 
purposes in the next budget year?"» 
% Favouring a real increase 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
For universitiesb 30 33 43 49 56 51 
For all levels of 
education 36 35 46 50 61 50 
For all purposes n.a. n.a. 26 25 32 27 
N 1084 1108 1050 1042 1011 1032 
a Options for each question were: increase greatly = 1 
increase somewhat = 2 
keep up with inflation = 3 
decrease somewhat = 4 
decrease greatly = 5 
b A comparable 1975 survey found 25 percent of Ontarians supported incrased spending 
for community colleges and universities combined, (see Auld, 1979) 
Sanders, 1988). For example, an extensive series of surveys of the Ontario pub-
lic's fiscal priorities in the mid-1980s found substantial and growing support 
for increased education funding coupled with strong sentiments to cut back gov-
ernment spending in general and on such areas as assistance to the arts, tourism 
development and highway construction in particular (see Goldfarb, 1985). Few 
are now prepared to trade-off education. 
Surveys in many advanced industrial societies over the past thirty years 
have generally found education to be rated among the higher national priorities 
(see Cantril, 1965; Farah, 1979; Flather, 1988). With increased fiscal constraints 
on government spending, this relative priority appears to have increased. In the 
U.S. during the 1970s, public support for education spending remained stable, 
while support for virtually all other social service spending declined (Smith, 
1982). In Ontario, as Table 1 shows, support for increased government spending 
in general remained fairly stable in the 1980s, in contrast to increases in support 
for universities and formal education in general. It is certainly clear that 
Ontarians and other Canadians gave high fiscal priority to education and univer-
sity spending during the past decade (e.g., Hughes, 1979; Opinion and Research 
Index, 1981; Livingstone, Hart & McLean, 1983; Tausig, 1991) and are current-
ly strongly opposed to any tax cuts tied to reductions in education and health 
care services (Bozinoff & Macintosh, 1988; Todd, 1990). Moreover, the vast 
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majority of Ontarians currently would prefer to finance increase education 
spending through reduced spending in other areas, rather than increase either 
taxes or the government deficit; and over two-thirds of those who favour 
increased general education and university spending are also willing to pay 
higher taxes for education (Livingstone, Hart & Davie, 1991; cf Johnson, 1985; 
Krahn, 1991). While the results of the 1990 Ontario survey and a comparable 
1991 poll (Adams, 1992) suggest that the growth in support for increased 
spending on education may have very recently abated, there is little indication 
here that the Canadian public is seeking "something for nothing" in expressing 
its support for university funding. So what factors have been related to support 
for university funding during this period of growing public support? 
Explaining University Funding Preferences 
There has been virtually no prior research in this country - or elsewhere to our 
knowledge — on the determinants of public attitudes toward university funding, 
beyond the descriptive statistics on social background differences sometimes 
reported in the previously cited survey reports. On the basis of a review of the 
generally relevant empirical literature in Canada and abroad, as well as consid-
eration of general theorizing about political attitude formation, we have identi-
fied four major types of factors for systematic investigation: (1) societal-level 
contextual effects; (2) socio-economic status; (3) demographic variables; and 
(4) political orientation. 
In the following sub-sections, rationales will be discussed for specific 
potential factors, any prior research will be cited, and empirical findings drawn 
from secondary analysis of relevant indicators in the OISE Surveys will be pre-
sented.4 The OISE Survey of Educational Issues has been conducted biennially 
since 1980 with a representative sample of Ontario adults. In addition to provid-
ing time-series data on attitudes toward university funding and a wide variety 
of other educational policy matters, this survey also includes an exceptionally 
wide array of measures of pertinent social background factors (see especially 
Livingstone, Hart & Davie, 1985, pp. 53-65). 
Contextual Factors 
Macro-level contextual factors are typically ignored in research on the determi-
nants of attitudes. There is a prevalent tendency in interpretations of attitude 
survey data to consider only individual attributes in ahistorical and atomistic 
ways; more rarely, contextual factors will be alluded to but excluded from 
analysis because they "were not present in the data at hand" (Smith, 1982, p. 176). 
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However, contextual factors may often be of central importance for understand-
ing both patterns and changes in public attitudes. In broad comparative histori-
cal terms, different levels of societal industrialism, as indicated by urbanization, 
political democracy and institutionalization of state-sponsored social programs, 
presumably affect the public's disposition to support both university funding 
and government social welfare spending generally (see Pampel & Williamson, 
1985). Within current advanced capitalist societies, there are at least four con-
textual factors of likely relevance to recent changes in the extent of public sup-
port for university funding: (1) the impact of economic restructuring on the 
d e m a n d for h igh ly educa ted workers ; (2) the ac t ions of un ivers i ty 
decision-makers to put "underfunding" on the political agenda; (3) the increas-
ing aggregate educational attainment of the population; and (4) a rapidly aging 
population with growing proportions of middle-aged "baby boomers" and 
senior citizens. 
These contextual factors are clearly of different orders. Economic restruc-
turing is a broad-based movement directly altering the life-circumstances of a 
significant portion of the populace and likely affecting the perceptions of many 
more regarding the relationship of education to the labour market. The lobbying 
and public relations activities of university officials are, in comparison, a more 
superficial influence on people's thinking, although one directly focused on the 
issue of funding. The trends toward increased aggregate educational attainment 
and aging involve changes in the proportions of different social groups which 
initially vary in degree of support for university funding. (These demographic 
shifts may or may not also entail, in and of themselves, changes in attitudes.) 
To echo Smith (1982), measures of the impingement of these contextual 
factors on individuals are, with the exception of some perceptions of the chang-
ing labour market, "not present" in our data. For the most part, our speculations 
on the impact of economic restructuring and of publicity campaigns are based 
on the concurrence of trends and events. In the case of changes in educational 
attainment and age structure, however, it is possible to assess the extent to 
which demographic shifts alone can account for increasing aggregate public 
support for spending for universities. 
Impact of Economic Restructuring 
Most advanced industrial regions, including Ontario, have been afflicted by 
slow economic growth rates punctuated by recessions since the early 1970s. 
Among the more demonstrable cumulative effects during the past decade have 
been growing numbers of plant closures and off-shore relocations, higher levels 
of structural unemployment, and sustained efforts by employers to implement 
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micro-electronically-based technological changes coupled with industrial rela-
tions strategies to encourage employees to "work smarter" (see Harrison & 
Bluestone, 1988; Ross & Trachte, 1990). The general message coming consis-
tently from both corporate business and government in recent years is that we 
will need a more highly educated workforce in order to respond to global com-
petition (e.g.. Ontario Premier's Council, 1990). This message contrasts marked-
ly with a prevalent concern in the prior decade about an "overeducated" 
workforce (e.g., Freeman, 1976; Clark & Zsigmund, 1981). 
The impact of both widespread experience of workplace restructuring and 
the dominant rhetoric of global competition on popular consciousness about the 
present and future significance of higher education appears to have been quite 
substantial. Between 1979 and 1986, the proportion of the Ontario public that 
judged a postsecondary education to be "very important" nearly doubled, from 
34 percent to 61 percent; this increase was generalized across all major social 
groupings, including all age cohorts and educational levels . Importance ratings 
showed a significant positive association with support for university spending in 
1986 (tau - b = .12***) when both questions were included in the OISE survey 
(Livingstone, Hart & Davie, 1987, pp. 4-5).5 
There has been a growing consensus during the past decade that the skill 
required by the workforce is increasing and that the impact of recent technologi-
cal change has been to increase educational requirements for jobs. These widely 
presumed trends are consistent with a popular expectation that the proportion of 
jobs requiring a university degree will generally increase over the next genera-
tion. This growing consensus on increasing job requirements corresponds with 
the increasing support for university funding. But funding support is not closely 
related to the perceived current job market situation. For example, between 
1984 and 1986 support for university funding continued to increase even though 
over 80 percent of the Ontario public thought that there were many more job 
seekers with university degrees than jobs requiring degrees (see Livingstone, 
Hart & Davie, 1987, pp. 13-15). 
In fact, there is considerable evidence that the Canadian job structure has 
recently been polarizing into "good jobs" typically requiring post-secondary 
qualifications, and "bad jobs" with few entry requirements (Economic Council 
of Canada, 1990). But even if current unemployment and underemployment of 
some university graduates is evident (and a large number of jobs do not demand 
advanced education), the general ethos appears to have been established during 
the 1980s that a postsecondary education will be needed in order to cope with 
technological change and "get along" in future society (see Livingstone, Hart & 
McLean, 1985). 
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University Responses to Funding Crisis 
Although pos tsecondary level expansion commitments made during the 
post-World War II era of sustained economic growth secured university fund-
ing into the 1970s, the cumulative impact of slow economic growth also 
increasingly limited government revenues and led to declining budgetary priori-
ty for universities during the past decade.5 The universities' share of Ontario 
provincial budgetary expenditures declined from about 6 percent to 4 percent 
between 1977-78 and 1991-92; these reductions, combined with continuing 
enrolment increases, have resulted in steadily declining expenditures per student 
through the 1980s (OCUFA, 1991, p. 3). The capping of federal transfer grants 
designated for postsecondary education and health, which was vigorously 
protested at First Ministers' Conferences during the late 1980s, has further 
threatened the provision of established university programs (National Council 
on Welfare, 1991; Statistics Canada, 1991). 
Deteriorating financial conditions provoked university leaders into histori-
cally unprecedented appeals for funds and the imposition of more restrictive 
admission policies (e.g,. Hay & Basran, 1991; Crawford, 1991). The Council of 
Ontario Universities launched a sustained publicity campaign to alert the public 
to the "underfunding" crisis (COU, 1984, 1988). Individual universities initiated 
major new community fund-raising campaigns and some announced land 
sell-offs to ensure their viability. De facto grade point averages for entrance 
rose at some universities despite the formal government policy of universal 
access for all qualified applicants. 
In this situation, a generalized public consensus is being expressed that lack 
of funding is leading to a serious problem and continuing deterioration of uni-
versity education; two-thirds of Ontario citizens now spontaneously mention 
either lack of funding or tuition fees as the most important problem facing the 
province's universities (Decima Research. 1990).7 
Increasing Post-Secondary Attainment 
Canadians have long been among the most highly schooled populations in the 
world, with our average years of schooling only exceeded by the United States. 
But in 1960, fewer than 10 percent of our 18 to 24 population were participating 
in postsecondary education, considerably lower than in the U.S. Over the fol-
lowing decade, the creation of new universities and community college systems 
led to a 50 percent increase, to about 15 percent of 18-24 year olds. This partic-
ipation rate remained quite stable through the 1970s. But it again increased by 
about 50 percent between 1980 and 1990, to involve about 22 percent of this 
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age group (Nobert, McDowell & Goulet, 1991, p.23). In addition, rapidly grow-
ing numbers from older cohorts were both staying longer in full-time postsec-
ondary studies and coming back later for postsecondary credit courses on a 
part-time basis; so that total postsecondary enrolment rates now closely rival 
those of the U.S. (Nobert, McDowell & Goulet, 1991, pp. 36, 38). In Ontario, 
the general adult education participation rate, including particularly postsec-
ondary credit courses, grew very rapidly during the late 1980s (Livingstone, 
Hart & Davie 1991, p. 21). There are signs here of the emergence of a "perma-
nent education culture", with the majority of adults now having participated in 
non-formal education courses, and with increasing numbers seeing postsec-
ondary institutions as a prime site for adult learning. 
Those who have been successful in any system probably tend to be more 
favourably disposed toward it. But, even if all postsecondary graduates became 
system advocates, the increasing numbers of graduates over the past decade are 
far from sufficient to account directly for the increased magnitude of public 
support for university spending. A more inclusive "exposure thesis" is also pos-
sible. That is, if one has ever enrolled in any university or other postsecondary 
institution, she/he may become both more familiar with and more sympathetic 
to the financial limitations faced by such institutions. About half of the adult 
Ontario population has now attended a postsecondary institution at least briefly 
at some time in their lives (Livingstone, Hart and Davie, 1991). This may sug-
gest some cumulative effect of multiple forms of direct post-secondary experi-
ence in relation to the now majority support for increased university spending. 
In any case, rapidly growing aggregate postsecondary educational attainment is 
likely to have been a contributory factor to the increased support for university 
spending over the past decade. 
An Aging Population 
As a consequence of its heritage as a colony based largely on European immi-
gration, Canada has historically had one of the youngest populations of all the 
advanced capitalist societies (Wigdor & Foot 1988, p. 4). But Canada, like the 
others, has witnessed a remarkable increase in life expectancies during this cen-
tury as a result of improved medical technologies, extensive immunization 
against infectious diseases, better diets and more effective sanitation systems. 
The most dramatic changes up to mid-century were in the form of sharp 
declines in the mortality rates of infants and young people. But, particularly in 
Canada, in the aftermath of World War II the return home of hundreds of thou-
sands of military personnel to start families in the context of an expanding 
indus t r ia l e conomy and a quickly rising s tandard of l iving led to an 
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unprecedented baby boom through the 1950s. Then the long dominant associa-
tion between rising standards of living and declining fertility rates reasserted 
itself, so that by the 1970s the proportion of the population under 18 was drop-
ping rapidly. Declining fertility combined with increased longevity translated 
into a rapidly aging population. During the 1980s, the proportion over 45, and 
especially over 65, continued to increase quickly; while the huge baby boom 
generation entered middle age, increasing the 35 to 44 cohort by well over 40 
percent. Coupled with restrictive immigration, these trends are destined to pro-
duce a continually aging population well into the next century.8 
Aging has generally been presumed to be inversely related to interest in 
education. As the entire population ages, then, one would predict a decline in 
aggregate support for education spending. For example, an aging population 
makes increasing demands on other public services, most notably health ser-
vices, that compete with education for limited state revenues. It is often 
assumed that older people's more compelling need for scarce health care ser-
vices provokes them into growing resentment of university funding. Whatever 
the specific rationale, it has been widely asserted that general support for educa-
tion spending should decline with an aging population (e.g.. Stager, 1985). 
On the other hand, the aging of the post-War generations could be associat-
ed with a more positive new "period effect". That is, the pre-War generations, 
now over 50, had very little opportunity for access to the small number of uni-
versities in existence when they were growing up prior to the 1960s, and hence 
little chance to develop a sympathetic understanding of universities" financial 
needs. According to this argument, as an increasingly educated population (and 
most significantly, the post-War baby boomers, gets older) the prior negative 
impact of aging on support for education spending should diminish. We will 
examine the specific individual effects of age, as well as educational attainment, 
during the past decade closely in later sections. But aggregate changes in the 
age structure in the 1980s are also not of sufficient magnitude alone to account 
for the increase in public support for university funding. The 35 to 44 year old 
cohort of baby boomers, for example, only increased from about 11 to 16 per-
cent of the Canadian population (Picot 1980). Any changes in the contextual 
effects of both age and education over this decade must therefore have been 
supplemented by other contextual effects and/or by the potential individual 
effects to which we now turn. 
Socio-Economic Status 
It has generally been argued that higher socio-economic status should be asso-
ciated with greater individual support for education spending. One common 
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version, the individual-level variant of the previously mentioned exposure the-
sis, argues that the more fully exposed to and socialized by formal schooling 
individuals have been, the more appreciative of the value of education and more 
supportive of funding they will be. Another argument focuses on income levels 
and contends that greater support is based on greater ability to pay from "sur-
plus" funds. A third version stresses that upper classes will be more supportive 
of funding because they sense that institutionalized forms of schooling serve to 
legitimize and reproduce their dominance in society. (See, for example, 
Campbell & Eckerman 1964; Smith 1982; Baer & Lambert, 1982.) 
Conversely, a few theorists have posited a negative relation between higher 
status and support for general education funding, in terms of relative tax burden. 
That is, upper income people are assumed to "pay for more public services than 
they consume so that they will oppose more spending since it has a high 
cost-to-benefit ratio for them" (Smith 1982, p. 177). However, the applicability 
of this logic to support for university funding is most doubtful, as the middle 
and upper classes have clearly been the major beneficiaries of university pro-
grams (see Anisef 1986). 
The relationships of the relevant dimensions of socio-economic status 
(SES) - educational attainment, family income, occupational class and subjec-
tive class identity - to support for real increased spending on universities in 
Ontario between 1980 and 1990 are summarized in Table 2.9 Educational attain-
ments are measured by highest level, distinguishing between attendance and 
completion. The family income variable represents a collapsing of the differing, 
more detailed scales used in each survey to approximate quartiles as closely as 
possible . The occupat ional class variable is a collapsed version of the 
Porter-Pineo categorization (Pineo, Porter & McRoberts, 1977). Class identity 
is measured by a standard forced choice survey question. 
Educational attainment is consistently related to spending preferences 
throughout the decade, with more frequent support for increased spending on 
universities among the more highly educated. Family income, occupational 
class and class identity are all found to have more irregular and generally weak-
er relations with spending preferences. Where differences appear, increased uni-
versity funding does tend to get higher support among higher income groups; 
the income association, however, is quite erratic over the 1980 - 90 period.10 In 
contrast, occupational class differences clearly diminished with the broadening 
of support for increased funding during the 1980s. For example, in 1980 about 
half of all professional-managerial employees but only a quarter of unskilled 
workers supported increased funding, compared to about 60 percent of both 
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Table 2 
Socioeconomic status and support for increased spending for universities 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
Educational attainment .12*" .12*" .14"* .17*" .14*** .14*** 
Family income .07* .13"* .00 .03 .07* .12*** 
Occupational class .11". .08*- .01 .10" .01 .01 
Class identity .08" .14*" .07* .13*" .06* .06* 
Legend: Kendall's tau * < .05 ** < .01 *** < .001 
a Spending preference recoded to decrease = 1 ; 
keep up with inflation = 2 
increase = 3 
b Educational attainment: some elementary = 1 
complete elementary = 2 
some high school -= 3 
complete high school = 4 
some community college = 5 
complete community college = 6 
some university = 7 
complete university = 8 
c Income groups: aggregation into four categories paralleling quartiles (from lowest to 
highest income) as closely as possible 
^ Grouping of Porter-Pineo categories: 
unskilled workers & farm labourers (14-16) = 1 
farmers, skilled & semi-skilled workers (9-13) = 2 
semi-professionals to foreperson (4-8) = 3 
professionals to high managers (1-3) = 4 
e Class identity: Responses to the question, "If you were asked to use one of the follow-
ing names for your social class, which would you say you belonged to?" 
lower or working class = 1 
lower middle class = 2 
upper middle or upper class = 3 
groupings by 1990. Self-identification as upper middle class is also moderately 
more likely to be associated with support for increased university funding. But 
those with working class identities also gave majority support by the late 1980s. 
Table 3 presents the patterns of support by educational attainment in more 
detail. There have been substantial increases in support for more university 
funding at all levels of educational attainment except those with only elemen-
tary schooling. In 1980, about half of all university degree holders favoured 
increased funding, compared to around a third at most lower attainment levels. 
By 1990, support had increased to two-thirds among degree holders but also to 
majorities among all others who have gone beyond elementary school. 
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Table 3 
Spending preferences for universities bv educational attainment 
% Favouring a real increase 
Educational 
attainment 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 (1980-90) 
Elementary only 26 28 33 36 4 0 31 (+5) 
Less than high school 29 29 43 49 54 54 (+25) 
High school diploma 36 36 42 4 6 62 51 (+15) 
College certificate 
or equivalent 28 33 4 6 61 59 56 (+28) 
University degree 48 4 9 58 64 71 6 6 (+18) 
At the beginning of the 1980s, significant positive associations were found 
between higher status on all four SES measures and support for university fund-
ing, lending some credence to the class dominance and ability to pay arguments 
as well as to a university-specific socialization thesis. However, the disappear-
ance of occupational class effects during the decade, and the irregularity of 
income effects, argue against enduring instrumentalist explanations for support 
of university funding. While the positive influence of educational attainment 
appears to remain significant, any university-specific socialization effect also 
seems to have diminished. By the end of the decade, the most distinctive feature 
was not a much greater support by the university degree holders, but the persis-
tent lack of support among those with only elementary schooling. These find-
ings suggest that positive views of university funding had become more rooted 
in a generalized cultural valuation of higher education than in sustained social-
ization within universities.11 
Demographic Factors 
Numerous other objective conditions of individuals' life experiences could 
plausibly influence their dispositions to support university funding. We will 
consider five of these: age, sex, the size of one's community, the particular 
region lived in, and ethnicity.12 
Age effects have been found most frequently in prior research but are also 
most difficult to specify. We have already referred to possible general contextu-
al effects of an aging population and the particular experiences of distinct 
cohorts (such as the post-War baby boom generation) on educational attitudes 
during the period of the 1980s. In addition, individuals' passages through stages 
of maturation are also likely to influence their attitudes. Attempts to separate 
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such historical period, cohort and maturation effects have been deemed a "futile 
quest" (Glenn, 1976; see also Smith, 1989). 
Two major explanations for a negative relation of individual aging with 
support for education in general and university spending in particular have been 
posited: the lack of relevance of university education to older people, and con-
tending tax priorities for health and retirement needs. 
The irrelevance argument is typically based on the assumption that senior 
citizens are too old to learn complex bodies of knowledge. While some seniors 
may indeed believe this, the myth has been refuted by considerable research as 
well as by the greatly increasing participation of seniors in adult education pro-
grams during the past decade (Wigdor & Foot 1988, pp. 47-65; Livingstone, 
Hart & Davie 1991, pp. 21-22). As for the contending fiscal priorities thesis, 
the notion is that aging individuals become more preoccupied with health ser-
vices for associated problems and with public retirement benefits than with edu-
cation funding. However, survey evidence for the early 1980s does not indicate 
dramatic differences in such fiscal priorities according to age. In fact, health 
services were the top priority for pluralities in all age groups, and priority for 
education exceeded that for retirement benefits among all age groups except 
those 60 to 64 , the immed ia t e p r e - r e t i r e m e n t years for most peop le 
(Livingstone, Hart & McLean 1983, pp. 10-11). There were few signs of shaip 
age-based division in fiscal priorities early in the 1980s. 
Whatever the adequacy of particular arguments based on maturation effects 
alone or in interaction with cohort and/or period effects, all explanations assume 
a continuation to varying degrees of a negative relation between individual age 
and support for education. 
With regard to each of the other demographic factors considered here, one 
could plausibly argue in terms of quite opposite effects according to the relative 
prevalence of either group-specific prior advantages from universities, or com-
pensatory demands to overcome prior discrimination by universities. That is, 
men, those in larger urban communities and southern Ontario regions, and those 
of British ethnicity have historically had relative advantages in university 
access, and might see further funding as continuing to reproduce their advan-
tages. Conversely, women, those in small communities and northern regions, 
and non-Europeans could see increased funding as providing greater opportuni-
ties to overcome their earlier relative disadvantages. Prior research offers only 
cursory theses and mixed findings on such variables (e.g., Hughes, 1979; Smith, 
1982; Smith, 1989). Table 4 summarizes the basic Ontario survey findings on 
all five demographic factors. 
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Table 4 
Demographic factors and support for increased spending for universities 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
Age • - .14"* .18*** - .20*** - .19*** - .18"* - .26"* 
Sex b .07* .01 .05 .09* .00 .01 
Community size c .05*. .08* .15"* . 1 4 ~ .12"* .18"* 
Regiond .03 -.06* .11"* .02 .00 .00 
Ethnicitye .11"* .06* .02 .14*** .05 .10" 
Legend: Kendall's tau * < . 0 5 * * < . 0 1 ***< .001 
a Spending preference recoded to decrease = 1; 
keep up with inflation = 2 
increase = 3 
18 - 29 = 1 
30 - 39 = 2 
40 - 49 = 3 
50 - 59 = 4 
6 0 + = 5 
Male = 1 
Female = 2 
<1000= 1 
1001-9999 = 2 
10,000 + = 3 
Northern Ontario = 1 
rest of the province = 2 
British = 1 
Other European = 2 
Non-European = 3 
As in all prior opinion surveys, age effects on funding are found to be high-
ly significant and negative in all years.13 Sex differences and regional differ-
ences are generally insignificant and inconsistent. Community size appears to 
be an increasingly important factor, with those people in large urban communi-
ties becoming much more supportive of university funding than those in small 
towns and rural areas who have more limited access to such education services. 
Non-European minorities are somewhat more supportive of increased universi-
ty funding than those of the historically dominant British background. The 
effect of ethnicity is of inconsistent significance, and those in minority groups 
with the highest current university participation rates -notably South East 
Asians but also those of European Jewish heritage (Herberg, 1989) — are proba-
bly now most supportive. 
k Age groups: 
c Sex: 
^ Community size: 
e Region: 
^ Ethnicity 
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Table 5 
Spending preferences for universities by age group 
% Favouring a real increase 
Age Group 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 (1980-90) 
1 8 - 2 9 46 47 60 63 71 68 (+22) 
3 0 - 3 9 30 44 46 59 56 56 (+26) 
4 0 - 4 9 32 24 46 53 64 58 (+26) 
5 0 - 5 9 28 23 34 40 49 47 (+19) 
60 + 19 22 30 37 44 28 (+9) 
Table 5 presents a breakdown of the age differences in support for universi-
ty funding. All age groups tended to become more supportive of increased fund-
ing during the decade. The gains in support were fairly evenly distributed across 
most age groups. Support among those under 30 increased from a near majority 
to over two-thirds, while among those 30 - 49 it grew from around one-third to 
clear majorities. There were comparable gains to near majority support among 
those 50 to 59, but more fluctuating and ultimately lesser gains among those 
over 60. Thus, even though support generally increased among all age groups, 
the negative individual effect of age on support for university spending may 
have also increased somewhat between 1988 and 1990. 
In sum, increasing support for university funding occurred across all demo-
graphic groupings considered here. In this context, age differences retained the 
strongest effects, with younger people being consistently more likely than older 
ones to favour increased funding. Community size was also a factor, with urban 
dwellers becoming more supportive. In fact, there were some signs of increas-
ing polarization in both the effects of age and community size by 1990, as sup-
port among both those over 60 and those living in small communities appeared 
to be diminishing from high points reached earlier in the decade. The influences 
of sex, region and ethnic differences were found to be either too weak or too 
inconsistent to be identified as having important sustained effects on attitudes 
toward university funding. 
Political Orientation 
It is commonly assumed that people's specific political attitudes are partly 
mediated by their affinities for general political ideologies and their affiliations 
with political parties espousing such ideologies. A central dimension of contem-
porary political ideologies is their views on state involvement in civil society. 
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On the left side of the spectrum in advanced capitalist societies are socialist ide-
ologies that advocate active state intervention to enhance the social entidements 
and power of working people and the poor. On the right end are conservative 
ideologies that stress the pre-eminence of property rights and the superiority of 
private market solutions over government involvement. In between, there are 
various social democratic and liberal democratic versions espousing pragmatic 
forms of mixed economies, with substantial state provision of social entitle-
ments (see Gamble 1981). Broadly speaking, leftist ideologies place greater 
emphasis on state provision of education services, including funding of public 
universities. 
The three dominant parties in Ontario politics during the 1980s have been 
fairly clearly arrayed along this state involvement continuum, f rom the 
l e f t - l ean ing New Democrats to the centrist Liberals and r igh t - l ean ing 
Progressive Conservatives. Of course, all three parties did devise versions of 
their political philosophies that were sufficiently popular to allow them to form 
provincial governments during the decade, in right to left sequence - the 
Conservatives until 1985, the Liberals from 1986 to 1990 and the NDP in late 
1990. In any case, one would expect that those seeing the NDP as closest to 
their own political views would generally tend to be most supportive of both 
social spending and university spending, while Conservatives would be least 
supportive. 
Of course, views on government spending in general (including other social 
spending but also infrastructure and police budgets) may not correspond exactly 
with views on university spending. As we have previously noted, many people 
are now prepared to trade-off other types of government spending to ensure 
education spending. Nevertheless, on both ideological and practical budgetary 
grounds, we would expect that support for increased government spending in 
general would be associated with support for increased university spending. The 
relevant findings on the influences of political party preferences and pro-gov-
ernment spending preferences on support for university spending appear in 
Table 6. 
The survey results indicate a fluctuating effect on the part of party prefer-
ence, with Conservative party adherents usually being less supportive of 
increased university spending than either Liberals or NDP'ers. But support for 
university funding grew through the decade across all party affiliations and, 
when support was generally highest in 1988, Conservatives were just as positive 
as others. Thus, the effects of general political orientations on spending prefer-
ences appear to be very much contingent on political parties' responses to 
changing contextual conditions (cf. Brodie & Jenson, 1988). 
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Table 6 
Politcal orientation and support for increased spending for universities 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
Political Party 
Preferencea .11*** .08" .04 .12"* .01 .16"* 
Pro-Government 
Spending b n.a. n.a. .26*" .35"' .35"* .35*" 
Legend: Kendall's tau * < .05 ** < .01 *** < .001 
a Political party preference: Progressive Conservative = 1 
Liberal = 2 
New Democrat = 3 
k Pro-Government spending: based on responses to the question, "What should happen 
to...total government spending for all purposes in the next budget year?" Response 
options are the same as for spending for universities (see Table 1). Codes used here for 
both preference questions are: decrease = 1 
just keep up with inflation = 2 
increase = 3 
As predicted, support for general governmental spending is strongly associ-
ated with support for university spending. This relationship appeared to become 
stronger in the latter part of the decade. Over three-quarters of those who 
favour increased general government spending now support increased universi-
ty funding. Also, among those who prefer general spending just to keep up to 
inflation, there is now a small majority support for increased university funding. 
In contrast, of those who want real cuts in general government spending, a 
steady one-third have been prepared to support increased university funding. 
Thus, while pro-government spending attitudes in general do not seem to 
be closely or consistently associated with individual voting preferences, at least 
in the Ontario context, they do appear to be central mediators of views on uni-
versity spending for many people. 
Multi-Variate Analyses 
Of course, all of the aforementioned individual-level factors simultaneously 
influence public attitudes towards university funding. We have undertaken a 
number of multi-variate analyses, using both parametric and non-parametric 
statistical techniques,14 to assess the relative effects of all the factors found to be 
related to views on university funding in prior sections. The major findings are 
summarized in Table 7 and Figure 1. 
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Table 7 
Relative effects of age and educational attainment on support for university 
spending' 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
Age effect - . 1 1 " ' - . 1 5 " ' -.17"' -.16"' - .15"* - .24*" 
Education effect .08* .07* .09* .12" .09* .08* 
Legend: Kendall's tau * < .05 * * < .01 *** < .001 
a The numbers are Person partial correlation coefficients, in each instance controlling 
for the effects of the other independent variable. 
Zero-order age and education effects have been found in virtually all 
empirical surveys of public attitudes toward educational funding. Table 7 shows 
the relative individual effects of age controlling for education, and of education 
controlling for age. While both age and education remain significant influences, 
it is clear that the age effect has been consistently stronger than the education 
effect, and that the age effect has increased since 1980 while the education 
effect has remained fairly constant. More detailed analyses indicate that the 
main age effects are among those without postsecondary attainments. That is, 
older people with limited formal schooling are much less supportive of universi-
ty funding than are younger people with limited schooling. 
The path model in Figure 1 displays all the posited individual factors that 
have had consistently significant effects since 1984. General dispositions 
toward government spending are confirmed to be most closely related to specif-
ic support for university spending. But age, education and community size all 
retain significant relative effects on university funding preferences apart from 
their relationships to general government spending. Age is clearly the most 
influential individual background variable, with both a direct negative effect on 
university funding preferences and an indirect effect through its increasingly 
negative influence on general government spending preferences. Both education 
and community size retain significant direct effects on university spending 
views but exhibit no consistent relationship with general government spending 
preferences. 
Overall, our analyses of individual-level effects suggest some polarizing 
tendencies in views about university spending. Elderly people, who are likely to 
be less formally educated and live in more rural communities, are both more 
opposed to increased university spending than younger people and increasingly 
likely to be against government spending increases in general. Their views 
.82/.77/.83/.68 .67/.59/.60/.59 
AGE 
.19**7- .12'"/- -057- -18' 









.., \o-l-0 6 ' 
Figure 1 
Path model of determinants of support for university spending. 1984-199CH 
The figures next to the curved lines are zero-order Person correlation coefficents for respective years. Those on the solid 
straight lines are standardized beta coefficients. Those above the dotted lines are the residual unexplained variance. 
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appear increasingly out of step with the majority, and particularly with younger, 
more highly educated urban residents who are the most enthusiastic supporters 
of increased university funding.These are merely tendencies, however, and one 
should be cautious about general explanations and predictions based on such 
individual effects, particularly as well over half of the variance in public support 
for university funding remains unexplained. 
Conclusion 
Several particular contextual factors were probably important positive influ-
ences on the increasing public support for university funding in Ontario, over the 
past decade. Under the impact of economic restructuring initiatives and increas-
ing formal educational requirements for jobs, an expectation became general-
ized that a postsecondary education will be needed to get along in future 
society. Secondly, the universities' unprecedented responses to relative reduc-
tions in government grants made the public increasingly aware of lack of fund-
ing as a serious problem. Thirdly, a rapid increase in the participation rates of 
both 18 to 24 year olds and older age groups in postsecondary institutions meant 
that a significantly larger proportion of the population was exposed to both the 
benefits and the financial limitations of such institutions. In addition, it should 
be noted that the prevalent political affiliation in Ontario shifted from right to 
left during the decade and that — while individual voter preferences at any 
given time remain contingent on changing party programs and strategies—this 
shift is consistent with some growth in general public openness to state spend-
ing on social services such as education. 
Several individual-level factors have also exhibited significant positive 
effects on support for university spending. In the context of the general political 
shift from right to left, attitudes towards general government spending have 
consistently shown the strongest direct positive relationship with attitudes 
toward university spending in particular. In the context of increasing aggregate 
educational attainments, higher individual attainments have retained a signifi-
cant positive effect on support for university spending. In the context of at least 
moderate increases in the urban composition of the Ontario population (see 
Simmons & Bourne, 1989; Ontario Ministry of Revenue, 1992), urban residents 
do seem to have become increasingly more supportive of university spending 
than rural people since 1980. All of these contextual and individual factors 
exhibit complementary positive effects on increasing support for university 
spending. 
The single important exception is age. The individual effect of age has been 
demonstrated to remain strongly negative, both in its direct influence on support 
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Table 8 
Changes in support for university spending among comparable age cohorts 
1980 and 1990 
(1980/1990) Cohort 1980 1990 (% Change) 
20-29/30-39 44 56 (+12) 
30-39/40-49 30 58 (+28) 
40-49/50-59 32 47 (+15) 
50-59/60-69 28 26 (-2) 
60-69/70-79 19 36 (+17) 
for university spending, and in its dampening of the positive influence of views 
on general government spending. These negative effects may even have 
increased as younger peoples' support for university spending grew somewhat 
more than old peoples' over the decade. But what about particular age cohort 
contextual effects? 
While it remains impossible to separate such cohort effects from the histor-
ical period effects cited previously (see Smith, 1989), Table 8 suggests what 
may have happened to the views of respective 1980 age cohorts with aging to 
1990. Juxtaposing ten year cohorts in 1980 with the next older cohorts in 1990, 
we find that in nearly all instances support for university spending increased 
significantly. The most substantial increase is among the leading edge of the 
baby boom generation, now dominating the 40 to 49 age cohort. Even among 
those now in their 70s, support appears to have increased over the decade. The 
lone exception is those now in their 60s, the cohort that directly grappled with 
financing its own retirement during this period; even here, however, there was 
no significant decline in support for university funding. Thus, at least over the 
past decade, aging does not appear to have been inevitably associated with 
diminishing support for university spending. 
To predict the future on the basis of extrapolations from the past is, at best, 
highly misleading (Livingstone, 1983). Period effects that emerged during the 
1980s — such as the concerted business and government appeals for a more 
highly educated work force to meet global competition, or the political shift to 
the left in Ontario — could just as quickly be reversed. However, the cumula-
tive growth of postsecondary participation levels and associated support for 
postsecondary funding is unlikely to be so rapidly altered. Opposition to univer-
sity funding could well increase among those groups most excluded from its 
benefits: those with only elementary schooling, rural residents, and the elderly. 
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But the n u m b e r s with only e lementary schooling are rapidly d iminishing , whi le 
rural res idents remain a small minor i ty of the total populat ion. On ly the e lder ly 
are a s ign i f ican t growing source of potential opposi t ion. But even a m o n g the 
elder ly , suppor t fo r greater universi ty funding has actually increased dur ing the 
past decade . Aga in , this could be reversed in reaction to ma jo r cu tbacks of state 
fund ing which threatened establ ished health services for the increasing elderly 
popula t ion . 
Fo r the shor t - t e rm, however , the array of social inf luences that coa lesced 
du r ing the pas t decade is mos t l ikely to main ta in s t rong publ ic s u p p o r t fo r 
increased universi ty funding. Indeed, there are even some indications here that 
popu la r suppor t for universi t ies cou ld cont inue to increase, to the extent that 
".. .a great mass of people of all ages feel they can c o m e and get their l ives revi-
ta l ized". 15 
Footnotes 
1 This has been the only publicly disseminated continuing opinion survey of 
educational policy issues in the country over the past decade. For detailed discussion of 
the survey's methodology and design, see Livingstone, Hart and Davie (1985). It should 
be noted that the published OISE Survey reports utilize standard Gallup Poll weightings 
for age and sex. The figures presented here have been reweighted to correct for an under-
representation of the least educated population, and therefore differ slightly from those in 
the reports. 
The correlation between support for community college funding and university 
funding is very high in all OISE Surveys, ranging from tau-b's of .63 to .83 over the 
decade. Most of the basic findings presented here apply as well to community colleges. 
These findings are omitted from the text largely for economy of presentation. Both col-
lege and university support are also quite highly correlated with support for spending on 
elementary and secondary education, ranging from tau-b's of .47 to .53. But significant 
social influences—notably educational attainment—differ somewhat. 
3 It should be noted here that some of the most powerful economic interest 
groups, most notably corporate executives, are generally opposed to increased govern-
ment social service spending and university funding as well (see Livingstone, Hart & 
Davie, 1991). For a classic statement of the interactions among "ruling class interests", 
intellectuals' policy analyses, mass opinion and government decision-making, see Key 
(1961). 
^ The most comparable prior analyses have been done in the U.S. and assessed 
factors related to support for education spending in general. Tom Smith (1982) assessed 
the effects of a wide variety of individual-level attributes during a period of stable sup-
port for general education spending, 1971 - 78. He found a strong age effect but no 
direct, independent effect of educational attainment on spending preferences. Wade 
Smith (1989) has examined a more limited set of factors in relation to increases in sup-
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port between 1972 and 1986. He found consistently higher support among younger birth 
cohorts and those educated beyond high school, as well as less consistent regional and 
racial differences. An extensive review of earlier U.S. research may be found in Piele 
and Hall (1973). 
^ Unless otherwise stated, zero-order correlations reported in text and tables are 
Kendall's tau-b's or tau c 's as appropriate. Significance levels are indicated with aster-
isks as follows: *< .05, **< .01, ***< .001 
^ For an insightful account of Canadian patterns of government funding and uni-
versity responses from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s, see Skolnik and Rowen (1984), 
especially Chapter 4 which focuses on the Ontario case. 
^ Public attitude tendencies appear to be more in accord with the universities' 
own increasingly strident claims of underfunding than with the conclusions of the vari-
ous externally-sponsored commissions which have typically been both more circum-
spect about financial impact and more interested in efficient re-organization of higher 
education (e.g., Bovey, 1984; Cameron, 1987). As the most recent commissioner has put 
it, with particular reference to the efforts of the COU (Smith, 1991. pp. 16-18): 
There is no evidence that financial restraint has caused a serious decline in the qual-
ity of university graduates and, according to this view, universities should take credit for 
having improved their productivity, at least as measured in graduates per dollar received. 
This argument, of course, puts universities in a position where they feel they are made to 
suffer financially because of the success of their dedicated efforts to protect students 
from the full consequences of what they see as government underfunding....It is clear to 
the Commission that a preoccupation with underfunding pervades every campus. 
® This account of Canadian demographic trends is based primarily on Wigdor 
and Foot (1988). 
9 It should be noted that in part as a function of the broad categorization of 
objective SES variables employed here, there is considerable heterogeneity even in polar 
categories. Thus, overall for example, a majority of those in the highest income category 
in each year do not have postsecondary credentials. Among the occupational classes, 
almost a third of the professional-managerial group do not hold postsecondary creden-
tials. There is thus wide scope for different patterns among SES variables which are 
themselves related. 
Several additional sub-group analyses were also conducted, using the family 
income variable. For example, among employed married men over 25 (for whom family 
income and individual income are likely to be most closely correlated) the association 
between family income and support for university funding is generally insignificant. We 
also investigated whether there is a relationship between family income and spending 
preferences among parents. The argument for expecting such a pattern is that lower 
income parents will view their children's opportunities to obtain a university education 
as highly dependent on government funding; while higher income parents will be less 
c o n c e r n e d , g iven that they have the r e sources to cope wi th 
'underfunding,' and that this may be accompanied by tax relief. This is a more specific 
version of the cost-benefit hypothesis referred to earlier. In fact, in only one year, 1982, 
are there statistically significant differences among parents by family income in support 
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for increased spending on universities. In this instance, those with higher rather than 
lower incomes are more likely to favour more spending. If the comparison is restricted to 
parents without high school diplomas (eliminating the possibility that the higher income 
group will be more supportive of spending because they are more educated), there are no 
significant differences among income groups in any year. 
11 We should note here that we have also explored the possible effects of under-
employment on support for university funding, using a variety of measures. Especially 
among increasingly underemployed young university graduates (see Nobert, McDowell 
& Goulet, 1991; Livingstone, 1992), this factor might be assumed to have significant 
negative effects. Underemployment is associated with educational attainment and, when 
the latter is controlled for, proves to have no significant negative effects on views about 
university funding. This finding is consistent with prior research on the lack of negative 
effects of underemployment on political attitudes (Burns, 1983; Livingstone and Bowd, 
1990). 
Ethnicity is a much more complex and nuanced social characteristic than these 
other demographic factors (see Isajiw, 1980; Hughes & Kallen, 1974). The sample size 
did not permit a detailed analysis of the differences among "visible minorities", for 
instance. 
We must mention here that some previous researchers have posited specific 
positive effects of current student or parent of postsecondary student status in terms of 
anticipated direct benefits of educational participation (see Smith. 1982). Such statuses 
have been closely related to age; any positive effects they may have become insignificant 
once age is controlled for in these samples. 
The multi-variate results displayed here are merely illustrative. Ordinal-level 
measures of partial correlation (e.g., Kendall's tau) and multiple simultaneous effects 
(e.g., log-linear models) are most appropriate with these variables. Interval-level mea-
sures (Pearson partial correlations and regression—based path models) are used here both 
for ease of presentation and because results with the respective statistical techniques are 
nearly identical with these data. For fuller discussion, see Pine (1977) 
^ Northrop Frye, cited in Wigdor and Foot (1988, p. 64). 
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